Latvia’s result in the referendum about joining the European Union, with 67 percent of a strong turnout voting “yes,” delighted the government and EU supporters.

For many it was also a great relief, as the curiously lacklustre pro-EU campaign seemed to be in serious trouble in the months before the referendum. A stronger campaign in the last weeks, the virtually unanimous editorialising in favour by media, and relentless European advice to vote “yes” had their payoff.

Yet the pressure may not have been the most important factor. The clincher may have been the increasing understanding by the ordinary voter that the “no” case was becoming incoherent, and the consequences too potentially dangerous. For those championing the view that common sense would prevail, their trust in the Latvian citizen seems to have been vindicated.

The weeks since the referendum have seen little afterglow of success. The EU has engaged again in a long-standing debate over its constitution, and the new candidate countries are needing to battle hard to ensure they don’t ecome sidelined. Most importantly, they oppose the proposal that the European Commission have rotating membership for the smaller countries. At the moment all members have one commissioner, and the new members want this to continue for them. And there is wrangling over how many seats each will hold in the European Parliament.

After offering their congratulations on the referendum, EU representatives have also been keen to remind Latvia, among others, of the need to live up to the varying demands for accession by May 1 (when they will be formally admitted to the EU), including reform of administrative and particularly judicial arrangements.

And predictably, Russia still hopes to put a spoke in Latvia’s accession to the EU, unless its demands for the rights of Russian speakers and non-citizens are satisfied.

And the pleasure and pride that surrounded Latvia’s “yes” vote in the referendum has been shortlived for other, more internal, political reasons.

Those outside Latvia will have noticed that since the referendum there has been a period of increasing political instability in the coalition government, for reasons that do not seem at all clear. Those in Latvia will remember that this latest fight in the coalition was ignited precisely on the night of the referendum, when the leader of the Latvia First Party, Ēriks Jēkabsons, stole the limelight by warning of impending dictatorship and claiming that the coalition was finished unless Prime Minister Einars Repše stepped down. Three hours later Jēkabsons said the coalition would continue! Commentators were confused by this bombshell, which cut across the increasing euphoria of the positive referendum result.

Rifts in the coalition are not news. But the timing and subsequent history of this latest skirmish have been unusual to say the least.

Repše called his opponents’ bluff, and the subsequent weeks have seen an extraordinary backdown by his coalition partners. Most amazingly, those who were dissatisfied with Repše’s leadership were not prepared to put the matter to a vote of the coalition or the Saeima, but argued that Repše himself should realise he is disliked and should stand down of his own accord! (The reader is asked to imagine how many politicians they know who would indeed step down if so politely asked.)

It is not difficult to find reasons for the dislike of Repše. While a popular figure among Latvian voters, both in Latvia and the west, Repše has proven himself extremely rigid in his dealings with his coalition partners, demanding complete loyalty to decided policy but giving his coalition partners little say in the direction of that policy.

Keep in mind that in the 2002 election campaign Repše and his New Era party believed they could achieve what had never been achieved in Latvia before: an absolute majority in the Saeima. Falling short of that, Repše has continued to wield power as if such a majority had been achieved, with the coalition partners feeling increasingly squeezed.

Repše has continued to be popular among voters by claiming that he has to be given the powers to effectively solve national problems, particularly those of corruption and law and order, and to make his government and economy run in as businesslike a way as he was able to do in his former job as chief of the Bank of Latvia.

Yet this promise of being an effective reformer is increasingly becoming the image of an authoritarian leader with a populist appeal, and most seriously he does not seem to be delivering the goods. A number of poor or puzzling policy moves have characterised his first year of office.

Repše’s arbitrariness seems to be increasing, but his coalition partners are unable to act. It appears that the threat of an early Saeima election, however theoretical, did affect the scared rabbits among his coalition partners to back down on their criticisms. They well understand that Repše is so dominant in public perceptions—and the coalition parties have trouble gaining any recognition at all—that the prime minister might come closer to his desired majority next time around, at the expense of the coalition.

Having joined Europe may indeed have been a triumph for common sense, but there is little common sense being displayed by Latvia’s politicians around their own village pump.

In a Sept. 14 referendum, nearly 67 percent of Estonian voters said “yes” to joining the European Union. While a spirited “no” campaign had been waged, the issue in Estonia was never really in doubt. So far eight candidate countries have put this question to a referendum over the past year, and all have voted “yes.”

Latvia is now the last to hold a referendum, scheduled for Sept. 20. The past few weeks of feverish activity by pro-EU forces seems to have halted the steady rise of a “no” sentiment. And they will certainly loudly trumpet the Estonian result. Even at this late stage, however, a positive outcome is not guaranteed.

(A total of 10 nations have been invited to join the EU in 2004. Nine countries, including Latvia, decided to put the membership question to a popular referendum. Cyprus ratified membership without a referendum.)

Recent polls in Latvia show little change from that of July, with still a bare majority favouring “yes,” but with a huge question mark over whether those opposed will show up to vote.

The shoring up of support for a “yes” result seems to be a significant achievement of Latvia’s popular President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga. The Latvian presidency is a largely formal position with only limited political power, and one which convention dictates stays out of day-to-day politics. On this issue Vīķe-Freiberga has chosen not to be a figurehead, but has thrown herself energetically into the campaign over the past month, riding her popularity to urge a positive vote.

Also—and ominously—she has warned the government that continued wrangling over the budget and other political sideshows can only harm the pro-EU cause. She has held numerous meetings with various social organisations and appeared at several public functions to encourage a “yes” vote, stressing the historically decisive nature of this decision for Latvia. And in case even this will not be enough, a host of European heavies including presidents and prime ministers have been visiting Rīga before the referendum to urge sceptical Latvians to embrace Europe.

Why has it been such hard labour for those who favour joining the EU? In terms of likely economic benefit, support for infrastructure, access to markets and the perceived security of the EU vis a vis Latvia’s eastern neighbour, the argument for joining the EU would seem to be quite self-evident. I wrote earlier about a series of political blunders that seem to have turned the populace against the government and by extension against the referendum on the EU, with proposed budget and welfare cuts being the main culprits. But the opposition to the EU has been more frustrating and more puzzling than simply a reaction to poor government politics. It seems also to demonstrate a tremendous shortcoming in public understanding of a complex but certainly not obscure issue.

Opposition to joining the EU has been much more a consolidation of untested prejudices almost stunning in their irrelevance yet with great ability to cause fear. Will petrol rise by 5 santīms or 15 santīms? Will all Latvian land be sold to foreigners? Will Latvia be flooded with immigrants of varied races? Will most farmers be put off the land?

Getting even more bizarre, Latvian chauvinists have argued that joining the EU will mean the EU will enforce Russian as a second official language, while Russian chauvinists have argued that joining the EU will obliterate Russian and lead to Latvian-only instruction in schools, thus scaring two large constituencies at the same time.

Equally concerning, however, has been the incompetence of much of the “yes” campaign—apart from the president’s intervention—in which official spokespeople have seemed poorly briefed on the EU, and offer only vague propaganda rather than specific information that could prove decisive.

The doyen of Latvian’s print journalists, Aivars Ozoliņš of Diena, has given the sternest warning, slamming the absolute irresponsibility of those who dithered with idiotic objections to the EU, or those who could not make up their minds because they seemed incapable of grasping the issues and the seriousness of the impending decision. He cites the example of a young Latvian opera singer, training elsewhere in Europe and looking forward to a life of European achievements, who when asked by journalists says she can’t make up her mind which way to vote in the referendum and changes her mind from day to day. What, asks Ozoliņš, changes from day to day in Latvia’s geopolitical situation, or its historical links to European culture, or the importance of the EU for Latvia’s economic or social future? Ozoliņš warns that the pro-EU camp’s assumption that the “simple common sense” of the people will bring the right result is a very dangerous assumption indeed.

Given this poor standard of public debate, are we seeing some uncomfortable evidence of a still infantile inability to face up to serious political decisions, and even more evidence of an astonishingly naive and provincial belief that sturdy Latvia can go it alone and doesn’t need anyone else for support?

Hopefully, the Estonian result, as well as Lithuania’s earlier decision, may just sway enough Latvian voters to follow their two neighbour states into the EU.

Unfortunately, the Estonian result is not the only international event that has shaken Baltic perceptions of the EU. The tragic assassination of Sweden’s foreign minister, Anna Lindh, in a Stockholm department store had reverberations. Swedes in their own referendum voted against joining the euro monetary zone. Although it is a staunch member, Sweden maintains a sceptical stance towards some of the projects of the EU, particularly the union’s perceived lack of democracy and accountability. Citizens are picking and choosing what they will or will not support regarding the EU, and despite Lindh’s enthusiastic advocacy of adopting the euro, even her dramatic death could not persuade Swedish voters.

The stakes could not be higher for Latvia.

As Latvia moves towards the Sept. 20 referendum on joining the European Union, recent events have unexpectedly created uncertainty over whether a yes vote can be confidently expected. These events include a tightening of Latvia’s budget and slashing of some services, confusions over social security and other payments, mooted rationalisation of local government boundaries and functions, and some clear panic in government ranks about increasing opposition to the EU.

This chain of events has been added to what are now regarded as “traditional” arguments against joining the EU: fear of a flood of migration, of rising prices and of uncertainty in the agricultural sector, as well as general scepticism over the tangible benefits that individuals will get from joining the EU. While proponents of joining the EU have tended to regard the referendum as a foregone conclusion in the past, and have tended to denigrate or dismiss opponents, they are now clearly working much harder to get their message across.

The force of all these concerns was demonstrated in the results of a July opinion poll by Latvijas fakti that showed an 8 percent drop since June—down to 49.6 percent—in the proportion of Latvian citizens who said they would vote yes in the referendum. Opponents meanwhile grew by 10 percent and now represent 34.4 percent of respondents, while those uncertain dropped slightly to 15.9 percent.

The shock of the poll was in seeing support fall below the decisive 50 percent line, and to experience such a massive fall in just one month. Some commentators have stressed that the key will be the number of people who participate in the referendum, as many opponents simply will not vote. However, the July survey has itself electrified opposition and made the government even more jumpy.

The issue of the state budget does have a link to the EU, but not in the way it has been exploited by opponents. In line with EU demands, all candidate nations have to get their budget deficit down to 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product. In Latvia’s case this was a relatively small step, the previous deficit being 3 percent. Moreover, Latvia’s economy and with it government revenue have grown strongly so that there will actually be an increase of some LVL 150 million in budget expenditure in the coming year, making the needed savings relatively small.

But when all ministries nevertheless were asked to submit plans for economising, popular fear exploded that this would mean a reduction in the already meagre social security payments. The government said social security payments would not be cut and would in fact be increased in line with normal cost-of-living increases, but the damage was done: opponents of the EU could link joining the EU with undermining pensions. Subsequent plans to have budget cuts include a reduction of the police force and some other direct services have again created fears, which seem to now be systematically channelled into anti-EU sentiment.

The government also received poor press for its urging of ministers and coalition members to “talk up” the budget specifically to counter the “Eurosceptics”—a move widely seen as panicking and trying once more to pull the wool over the electorate’s eyes.

And it got worse for the government. In June, it revealed a plan for sweeping reform of local government, seeking to rationalise the number of local government authorities. This plan has nothing as such to do with the EU, which does not prescribe how local government should be organised. But there is much jockeying among local authorities for how eventual EU funds for regions might be accessed.

So again the issue was linked to joining the European Union and how it would reduce local sovereignty. And this growing opposition to the EU has in turn reinforced those who do not want local government reform on the scale envisaged.

Bad timing? Or bad politics? One lingering problem for the government is that its information program on the referendum and the EU has been generally seen as a costly, undiluted propaganda exercise urging a yes vote rather than giving useful and objective information about pros and cons and what can realistically expected if Latvia does join the EU.

This itself is only a part of deeper scepticism about politicians who urge joining the EU for their own career interests and the possibility of getting to well-paid positions in Brussels. The party that was most clearly identified with promoting the EU and with such a self-serving interests, Latvijas ceļš (Latvia’s Way), was punished severely in the last election.

The battle is far from over. Those outside Latvia often see joining he EU as an obvious step to take and one barely worth debating. For those on the ground in Latvia, it raises a host of other concerns about the political process and politicians that are hard to counter.