After the extraordinary Saeima elections of Sept. 17, Latvian voters have watched almost with disbelief at a shambles of a search for a viable coalition government.

Bad dealing, contradictions, second-guessing and sudden U-turns were frequent in wrestling with the overwhelming question of whether the Russian-leaning Harmony Centre (Saskaņas centrs), the party with the largest number of deputies after the elections, would form part of a coalition.

The Oct. 10 announcement that a coalition would finally be formed of the three centre-right Latvian parties, while welcome, still seems to have raised more questions than answers. Along the way, political reputations (some very recently established, some of longer standing) have been tarnished, and many voters are more than puzzled by why their party seemingly said one thing before the election and did something else afterwards—not for the first time in Latvian politics.

Harmony Centre won the election convincingly, with 31 deputies in the 100-member Saeima, with the Zatlers Reform Party (Zatlera Reformu partija, ZRP) claiming 22 seats, and the previously leading party Unity (Vienotība) claiming 20. The National Alliance (Nacionālā apvienība “Visu Latvijai!” – “Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK”) gained 14, while the previously strong and oligarch-aligned Union of Greens and Farmers (Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība, ZZS) trailed with 13 deputies.

Given that the ZRP and Unity appealed to much the same electorate, they took the lead in coalition discussions, but Harmony Centre gained great publicity from its strong showing (an increase of two deputies over the previous election) and seemingly confidently expected to be included in a coalition, despite fears by Latvian nationalists of what this would mean for governance. With the Harmony Centre victory predicted by all polls, speculation was rife as to whether the largely centre-right Latvian parties would countenance a coalition with Harmony Centre. The more nationalistic National Alliance flatly stated it would never be in such a coalition, but all other parties had varying positions. Critical was the attitude of the ZRP, which laid down conditions—very similar to those of Unity—to which Harmony Centre would have to agree: recognise the fact of Latvia’s occupation from 1940 (on which the Harmony Centre had always been equivocal); agree not to drive the budget into further deficit (the Harmony Centre had been claiming to be a socialdemocratic party with an stimulus-directed economic program); and for Harmony Centre to distance itlsef from the small rump of its party constituted by the Latvian Socialist Party, with former Communist First Secretary Alfreds Rubiks at its head.

Meanwhile, from right after the election, Unity had pushed the idea of an alliance between it, ZRP and the National Alliance, who they saw as ideologically most compatible.

In the two weeks after the election ZRP and Harmony Centre clearly moved closer to each other. In a move that has been interpreted in varying ways, Harmony Centre leader and Rīga Mayor Nīls Ušakovs at a foreign diplomatic gathering, speaking in English, referred to Latvia having been occupied for 50 years. Harmony Centre also in other statements agreed to not increase the current budget deficit. Following these events, on Oct. 1, while talks with Unity were still underway, ZRP announced unilaterally that it wished to form a coalition with Harmony Centre, and invited Unity to join. Unity responded angrily to this announcement, which it saw as provocative, and another week and a half of intense negotiation ensued. In this time Harmony Centre also agreed to distance itself from Rubiks, whose small rump has only three of the the party’s deputies.

Clearly, Harmony Centre was willing to agree with any demand made by ZRP simply to become part of the government coalition—a stance that now began to draw even some questioning from its usually supportive Russian-language press. ZRP voters believed they had been duped by the prospect of Harmony Centre as a coalition partner, though the ZRP had clearly alerted its electorate to this possibility in its platform, if anyone had cared to notice. Yet a number of ZRP deputies also expressed their disquiet after the announcement of coalition with Harmony Centre.

Unity believed this invitation was opportunistic and proposed in quick turn two alternative models: a five-party coalition of national unity, an absurd proposal, not least as ex-President Valdis Zatlers had categorically stated he would never work with the ZZS, who he saw as the party of oligarchs. (In a tangled story, it was these people who had persuaded Zatlers to stand for president four year ago, but then turned against him as he increasingly asserted his independence.) The proposal was quickly replaced by Unity’s try for a four-party coalition, bringing in ZRP, and the ideologically utterly opposed Harmony Centre and National Alliance. The National Alliance, with an increased representation in the new Saeima, had become prominent with a number of provocative actions stressing the continuing consequences of Soviet occupation and the dangers that beset the Latvian nation and culture from Russian political influence. It was fantasy to consider Harmony Centre and the National Alliance could ever be in coalition. Yet in fact this was all positioning by Unity to achieve its main aim—get Harmony Centre out of any coalition.

Meanwhile, events were unfolding around the notion of “occupation.” This has been a central and vexed question of Latvian politics, with one wing of pro-Russian sentiment (as with Rubiks) still maintaining that the Baltic states voluntarily joined the Soviet Union in 1940, a position completely rejected by the overwhelmingly majority of Balts. Harmony Centre now devised a truly Orwellian formula that it in turn put forward as its condition of joining a coalition: Latvia had been occupied, but there were now no longer any “occupiers”—okupācija bija, okupantu nav. In other words, no-one of the present was responsible for the occupation. This was to counter the more extreme nationalists who argued occupiers should leave Latvia.

Unity worked very hard behind the scenes, and it was clear that considerable pressure was mobilised to get ZRP to change its stance on coalition with Harmony Centre. Large numbers of Zatlers supporters (openly) and deputies (covertly) urged it to change. The agreement of Oct. 10 in which ZRP agreed to coalition with Unity and the National Alliance, was the result, gained by such tortuous means.

The whole event has shown very starkly the political lack of experience of the ZRP, formed barely three months ago. Zatlers has hardly had time to know his own party people, and his premature desire to be in coalition with the Harmony Centre cost him enormously in political capital.

However, it equally has also revealed either political naiveté or lack of political organisation on the part of the Harmony Centre. Some commenators have argued the party simply expected to be taken into government because of its election victory and offering a few program compromises, but others have argued Harmony Centre did not really want to be in government, given Latvia’s continuing economic woes.

After the Oct. 10 announcement of the new coalition, the Russian-language press predictably and uniformly had front covers denouncing “ethnic discrimination.” Meanwhile, Ušakovs had repeatedly stated that it was not only Russians who voted for his party, but many many Latvians as well. Who is discriminating whom remains the loud but tedious argument that never seems to leave Latvian politics. No wonder the voters—of almost all parties—are puzzled at the last month’s events.

After the passion of the July 23 referendum, in which 94 percent of voters supported former President Valdis Zatlers’ recommendation to dismiss the parliament, the weeks leading up to the election of the new Saeima on Sept. 17 have been generally lacklustre.

Given Latvia’s long-term economic plight, the limited room to move for any elected government and the remarkably similar programs all major parties present, there has been a campaign centring largely on personalities.

Zatlers has continued to be the key figure, and the promise of something new in Latvian politics, after his impressive decision in moving to dismiss the Saeima (for which the parliament rewarded him by electing a new president, Andris Bērziņš). Zatlers’ decision to form a new party rather than take up the leading party Unity’s (Vienotība) invitation to join it was probably correct, in that his party appears to have significant support in the electorate. Zatlers may have been overshadowed and his role downplayed if he had joined Unity, which is increasingly blamed for the perceived glacial rate of improvement in Latvia’s economy.

Yet Zatlers has not had it all his own way. Collecting a credible political party in the space of a few months has been difficult. His candidate for prime minister, Edmunds Sprūdžs, and several of his other key people are not widely known. Some have been shown to have less than spotless pasts (digging this up is a journalistic pastime in Latvia). Most of all, Zatlers has struggled to differentiate his party policy from that of Unity. His opponents point to his lack of political experience, though this cuts less ice as Zatlers has shown himself to be increasingly confident and knowledgeable in his appearances.

Several major questions have dominated political commentary, mostly concerning the party that has largely led polling (as it did before the last Saeima elections)—Harmony Centre (Saskaņas centrs ). This party, largely supported by Russian and other non-Latvian voters, is itself a combination of three factions, but includes a spectrum from hardline old Soviet folk (Alfreds Rubiks is one of its Eurodeputies) to very moderate and clearly pro-Latvian politicians. However, its alliance with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party and its prevaricating stance on many issues of Latvian history and identity has meant that many voters regard it with suspicion.

Two questions dominate regarding Harmony Centre: How well will it do in the elections and who is willing to bring it into a coalition government? After the last Saeima election and Unity’s victory, many observers were surprised the Unity turned around and invited Harmony Centre to discuss coming into coalition. Zatlers’ Reform Party (ZRP) has also indicated it would talk with Harmony Centre. Unity and ZRP have laid down preconditions, such as recognition of the fact of Latvia being occupied by the Soviet Union, and not changing the official state language (Latvian). Harmony Centre’s refusal to discuss the issue of occupation last time may have cost it a place in the governing coalition.

The fact that both Unity and ZRP are willing to countenance a coalition with Harmony Centre has alienated many supporters, but a look at the likely outcomes of the elections as judged by polling shows this to be a more-than-likely possibility.

Unlike previous years, the polls have shown a great deal of inconsistency. Over the past three to four weeks three separate companies—Latvijas fakti, Faktum and GfK—have produced different polls, as shown in this table:

The Latvijas fakti polling importantly indicated the undecided and non-participating voters, but Faktum does not, distributing the undecided among the other parties, while GfK does not give us any percentages, only the supposed number of deputies in the 100-member Saeima. According to both Latvijas fakti and Faktum, Harmony Centre and ZRP are neck-and-neck with Unity some distance behind, but with quite diferent outcomes predicted for the National Association. A potential coalition between ZRP, Unity and either the National Association or the Union of Greens and Farmers would appear to be on the cards. But Harmony Centre and ZRP could also go it on their own.

GfK, on the other hand, has put Harmony Centre way out in front, and the prediction of a stupendous 41 delegates in the early September poll is quite extraordinary. The polling company also sees Unity as pipping ZRP, and rates the National Association much lower. If the GfK poll is anything like correct, we can see an easy coalition between Harmony Centre and the pivotal Greens and Farmers, which has been influential in so many elections, has a kingmaker role and whose favouring of the arch oligarch Aivars Lembergs as prime minister reveals a total lack of political ethics and a willingness to do any deal to stay in power. It is the Greens and Farmers, as part of the current coalition government, that has often undermined Unity for its own ends.

In the polls before the last Saeima elections, Harmony Centre led in many polls, but was pipped in the election by Unity. A major factor here is in the undecided vote. The largely Russian voters who support Harmony Centre have usually clearly made their minds up well before the election. It is the Latvian voters who are most often undecided, but when they do make up their minds they will overwhelmingly go for one of the competing Latvian parties rather than Harmony Centre. This was the mechanism that enabled Unity to do so well in the last election, but it depended on getting the voters out in numbers.

Much depends on the mood of the electorate and whether they have enthusiasm for ZRP and Unity, or see little new in stock in Latvian politics, and have expended their passion on expelling the old Saeima, not electing the new.

Finally, if any coalition with Harmony Centre does come about, that may not be the end of the story. An organisation such as the NATO defense alliance may be quite interested in such a result, and decide not to share its secrets or in other ways put restrictions on a party that has close ties to Moscow. We will see.

Vote carefully in the coming election—a lot is at stake!

On July 23, by a 94 percent majority, Latvian voters as expected supported the referendum instigated by ex-President Valdis Zatlers to dismiss the Saeima. They will return to the polls on Sept. 17 to elect a new parliament.

This ended a truly unprecedented series of political events, and signalled the way for at least one new political force to take the stage in Latvian politics—Zatlers himself and his now many supporters.

On the same day as the referendum, Zatlers officially founded his party. Curiously, by many commentators’ estimation, he put his own persona in the party title: the Zatlers Reform Party (Zatlera Reformu partija, or ZRP). Such a person-driven approach seeks to capitalise on his popularity in dismissing the Saeima, which has rocketed Zatlers’ personal approval to 79 percent—an unusual rating for any Latvian politician.

As the referendum dust settles and Zatlers’ political course becomes clearer, two radically different interpretations are put on his motivation to dismiss the Saeima. The first takes Zatlers at his word that he wanted basically to rid the Saeima of the influence of oligarchs who control several political parties and who had instigated a series of votes against the national interest, or who had in other ways resisted necessary policy implementation. The trigger for Zatlers’ move was the Saeima’s decision not to allow the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs) to search the home of “bulldozer” MP Ainārs Šlesers. The concern of Zatlers had been to restore a measure of democracy to the working of the Saeima. The leading party, Unity (Vienotība), sharing such sentiments, in fact then invited Zatlers to join it, but he declined in favour of founding his own.

The second interpretation is far less favourable. When he triggered the referendum on May 28 by recommending the Saeima dismissal, Zatlers was faced with the likelihood that he would not be elected by the parliament to a second term. As it turned out, the Saeima appointed the financier Andris Berziņš to the presidency. The dismissal of the Saeima thus is viewed more as an act of revenge. And Zatlers further declined to join Unity as it had stood staunchly against any idea of a coalition with the second-largest party in the Saeima, the Moscow-leaning Harmony Centre (Saskaņas centrs). Zatlers was looking for his own political advantage, being willing to go into coalition with anyone to secure his own power.

Debate over Zatlers’ motives will continue, but meanwhile his popularity with the electorate has not diminished. In the first party ratings since its founding, ZRP ranked first with Harmony Centre, both favoured by 17.5 perent of the electorate. It seems that Zatlers had taken voters away from all parties, even marginally from Harmony Centre. Unity—the largest party in the dismissed Saeima—slumped to 8.7 percent, while the pivotal Union of Greens and Farmers (Zaļo un zemnieku savienību) declined to 8.1 percent. The Union of Greens and Farmers is very much associated with oligarch and Ventspils Mayor Aivars Lembergs. Also in decline, though less sharply, was the National Alliance (Nacionālā apvienība), claiming 6.3 percent support.

No other party came near to the 5 percent barrier required to sit in the Saeima. The great loser appears to be the oligarch Šlesers. His First Party of Latvia/Latvian Way (Latvijas Pirmā partija/Latvijas Ceļš) had managed to get into the Saeima on previous occasions after blitz advertising campaigns, but support for the party has dropped to just 1.7 percent.

On these figures, any kind of coalition is a possibility, either including or excluding Harmony Centre. Yet with more than a month to the elections, we may expect volatility as much as stability in predictions, as the heat is turned on Zatlers and his relative lack of political experience, and the very mixed bag of supporters who have flocked to his flag. An uncomfortable feeling comes precisely from the populist nature of his campaign so far, and the relative lack of substance in policy terms he has announced. While we are used to party platforms in Latvia often being very similar—so voters’ decisions revolve around personalities—the search for power seems to override careful policy considerations, making ZRP perhaps just one more party devised for an individual leader, rather than being a genuine party representing stable interests.

However, a further sense of discomfort comes from Zatlers’ own background. Four years ago, he was an apolitical surgeon who was installed as president by the same oligarchs he now berates. Also in the background is his self-admitted taking of “envelopes” (bribes) as a surgeon, as is the common practice in most post-Soviet countries. This makes his claims to be against oligarchy or corruption ring somewhat hollow.

Further, Zatlers’ battle cry to get rid of oligarchs has taken on a somewhat bizarre life of its own, with a number of popular events including a “festival for buried oligarchs” (Oligarhu kapu svētki) arousing hilarity.

Yet the real problems facing Latvia are not restricted to the activities of oligarchs, however odious. The painful road back to economic health in Latvia is hurting many. The country is experiencing depopulation as workers head abroad, and many small and medium enterprises are in trouble. The desire to repay loans to the International Monetary Fund and other lenders has led the government to slash wages and increase taxes.

Latvia now enjoys a two-track economy. One part, largely concerned with transit and finance, is experiencing a boom, but the rest of the economy depressed. Yet the parties struggle to devise any policies to address these issues. Unity’s insistence on repaying the debts, maintaining the value of the lat and tightening belts is being increasingly criticised as undermining any growth potential. And corruption is still widespread in administration, while the shadow (non-tax paying) economy remains strong.

Not to be outdone, Hamony Centre’s potential prime minister candidate, Nils Ušakovs, has proposed a radical suggestion: Political parties should put aside all issues to do with nationality and ethnicity—citizenship, official state language, language in schools, etc.—for a period of three years so that they can concentrate on solving the nation’s serious economic issues. Directed clearly at nationalist attempts to mobilise around issues such as having Latvian be the only language of instruction in schools, Ušakovs’ approach may yet strike a chord among voters, though it is unlikely to be accepted by other parties, whose own economic credentials are often weak and for which national issues may sometimes be a useful pretext to mobilise support.

Voters will be faced with more choice in these elections, but the substance of this choice will still be an open question as this intriguing battle intensifies.