Wahabist et al.,
‘The assets of the Republic of Lithuania were frozen as the Republic no longer existed. The gold deposits legally belonged to nobody. No entity existed that had rights to them - until 1991.”

Were the assets of Lithuania abroad handled by the Bank of Lithuania ?  To who belonged the Bank of Lithuania ?

Visu labu,

At first, Lithuania did not have gold or any other securities to back up the litas. Lithuania needed to find about 200 million U.S. dollars to form the stabilization fund. First, it sought to recover its pre-war gold reserves (about 10 tons) from France, United Kingdom, Switzerland, etc. In the interwar period Lithuania stored its gold reserve in foreign banks. After the occupation in 1940 those reserves were “nobody’s”: there was no Lithuania and most western countries condemned the occupation as illegal and did not recognize the Soviet Union as a successor. The Bank of England, for example, sold the reserves to the Soviets in 1967. However, in January 1992 it announced that this action was a “betrayal of the people of the Baltic states” and that it would return the originally deposited amount of gold, now worth about 90 million pound sterling, to the three Baltic states. Lithuania received 18.5 million pounds or 95,000 ounces of gold and remained a customer of the bank. Similarly, in March 1992 Lithuania reclaimed gold from the Bank of France and later from the Bank of Sweden.

In October 1992, the International Monetary Fund (Lithuania joined this organization on April 29, 1992) granted the first loan of 23.05 million U.S. dollars[6] to create the stabilization fund. However, it is estimated that at the time of the introduction of the new currency, Lithuania managed to gather only $120 million for the stabilization fund. For a brief while it was kept a secret so as not to further damage the reputation and trust in of the litas.

Were the assets of Lithuania abroad handled by the Bank of Lithuania ?  To who belonged the Bank of Lithuania ?

Seriously Bruno ? What part of Lithuania didnt exist anymore isn’t working for you ?

The soviets occupied the Baltics, nationalized all private enterprise - especially banks and finance. What part of the occupation don’t you understand ?

Wahabist et al.,
“The soviets occupied the Baltics, nationalized all private enterprise - especially banks and finance. What part of the occupation don’t you understand ? “

Who owned the National bank of Lithuania before the russians took over.  Was it a state enterprise ?
I am just trying to figure out what happened to the monetary assets that Lithuania had abroad, or perhaps
there were none.. The russians were unable to get their hands on the assets that Latvia had abroad, not that they did not try.

Visu labu.

If they were national assets - and the Bank of Lithuania was - they were nationalised.

If the assets were private, then they were private and were held by individuals. The diplomatic services, being a function of the Republic, were not financed privately until that point when no other funds were available to sustain them.

Lithuania no longer existed, thus it was impossible for Lithuanian national assets to finance anything.

Roses are red
Water is pourable
To be a Lithuanian and not know legal Latin ( ex injuria jus non oritur )
Is hugely deplorable.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_continuity_of_the_Baltic_states

State continuity of the Baltic states
From Wikipedia

State continuity of the Baltic states describes the continuity of the Baltic states as legal entities under international law[1] while under Soviet rule and German occupation from 1940 to 1991. The prevailing opinion accepts the Baltic thesis of illegal occupation and the actions of the USSR are regarded as contrary to international law in general and to the bilateral treaties between the USSR and the Baltic states in particular.[2]

This legal continuity has been recognised by most Western powers and is reflected in their state practice.[3] The application of the Stimson Doctrine by the Welles Declaration[4] where a significant segment of the international community refused to grant formal approval for the Soviet conquest,[5] the resistance by the Baltic people to the Soviet regime, and the uninterrupted functioning of rudimentary state organs in exile support the legal position that sovereign title never passed to the Soviet Union, which implied that “annexation occupation” (Annexionsbesetzung or occupation sui generis) lasted until re-independence in 1991.[5] Thus the Baltic states continued to exist as subjects of international law.[6][7]

[More “man-datory” reading follows.]

Princess, your injection of latin is poorly represented by the cut and paste of an opinion. There is continuity of an idea and an identity and then there’s succession. The fact that the Baltic states regained their independence complicates your misplaced use of “continuity”.

Or can you present to me who the legal head of state was of Latvia Michigan from 1945-1991 ? You know, for continuity’s sake ?

Succession ad integrum, Princess and ex factis jus oritur create problems for your slow motion train wreck of a worldview.

Veni Vidi - you keep trying so hard for vici but fail,

It’s not just legal Latin you don’t understand, it’s that your mind is too simple to manage complexity - which for a normal Balt is simplicity.  Latvia (and Estonia) restored de facto independence of a de jure existing state. 

What you think is true for Lithuania is your nightmare to unravel.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Act_of_the_Re-Establishment_of_the_State_of_Lithuania

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01629779300000141

Veni Vidi - you keep trying so hard for vici but fail,

Pull up your man jeans Princess. Your plagiarism is showing.

Do continue to read some Rein Mullerson though - even if your links dont attribute him.

I appreciate your linking Robertas Vitas. I grew up with him in the Chicago Lithuanian community Marquette Park. Knew him well. He wrote a very good book about the application of the Stimson Doctrine in the Lithuanian context - years before Google I’m afraid.

It’s not just legal Latin you don’t understand, it’s that your mind is too simple to manage complexity - which for a normal Balt is simplicity.  Latvia (and Estonia) restored de facto independence of a de jure existing state. 

De facto/de jure recognition was far far from universal Ambersun. You know that. Even those that did recognize it didnt fully recognize restored independence until after the SU collapsed. That by itself doesnt help your argument. If restored independence was so simply the recognition of a de jure existing State - then why did it take so long to be recognized ? We go back to how ex factis jus oritur isn’t your ideological friend.

Continuity was a problem Amber - the Lithuanian Seimas enacted important legislation in 1997 filling awkward gaps - had to be in retrospect as forming a new Republic was impossible. The post occupation diplomatic services, as your previous lazy cut and paste describes them as “rudimentary state organs”, had to be elevated to a new extra-legal position. The 1949 declaration produced by the Lithuanian partisan leadership also had to be elevated to, as Seimas then proclaimed, an act of State. All in retrospect Princess. Apparently the song and dance festivals in Michigan weren’t deemed sufficient action in support of the State or continuity. In fact, the diaspora isn’t represented in the any meaningful way.

How did Latvia and Estonia regain independence ? Even a simple mind can recognize that restitutio ad integrum was impossible. 50 years had passed. It was a different world. Latvia and Estonia restored their interwar Constitutions in bits and pieces as parts of it were no longer valid or applicable. How about treaties that they were members of ? How about membership in international organizations Princess ? They all had to be re-evaluated as 50 years had passed.

Now that lazy wiki link you presented regarding the “re-establishment” (sic)...Before March 11 1990 there was February 7 1990 - an act of the LTSR AT that set the foundation of legal continuity. Critical act in fact.

Do you know what that was Princess ?

About Ulmanis, my parents and their circle of friends, pretty much all born in the decade prior to and after 1900, remembered the Ulmanis regime from their adulthood, not as myths passed down in the trimda. I’m discouraged that current fashion appears to be to hurl stones and allege utopian fantasies about a fictitions golden-age Ulmanis regime, and out of context of a period of history when even FDR was offered President for Life.

I appreciate the history of those who were caught up on the opposite side and wound up in jail undeservedly. But let’s not pretend Ulmanis softened the Latvians for Soviet subjugation. We can’t project today’s sensibilities on another time and place.

Sveiks Pēter!

That was well said. I concur.

Ar cieņu,

Alberts

I most definitely do not concur. Criticism of the Ulmanis regime is not a “fashion”—it is as necessary as what many Letts so often demand of Russia: that it face up to its history. Nor is there a stone-hurling trend—plenty of pro-Ulmanis propaganda is still being churned out, from the musical by the vociferously anti-democratic Kaspars Dimiters (who, by the way had this to say last month: “Jau Kārlis Ulmanis ir teicis, ka teļos ir mūsu nākotne, es gribētu teikt, ka krievos ir mūsu nākotne”) to polemics by the prominent lawyer and writer Andris Grūtups. VL, the far right party now in Government, continues to celebrate the coup like this. Dismissing the fact that some historians offer fresh criticism of Ulmanis as a mere “fashion,” and suggesting that such criticism is necessarily taken out of its temporal context, is dangerously misleading. Further, as Strenga mentions in his review of the musical, in passing— the criticism is not new: “Pārcilvēks – vadonis Ulmanis, kurš, libretista vārdiem‚ ‘radījis šo valsti’ un bez kura ‘tās nebij un nebūs’, nav mīts – bet ir paša vadoņa režīma radīta konstrukcija, kuru Kaspars Dimiters vien aizņēmies lietošanai. Šī pagātnes konstrukcija ir gluži vai iedzīta nācijas atmiņā, un to no turienes ir grūti izdzēst par spīti vēsturnieku un intelektuāļu kritiskajiem viedokļiem vairāku gadu desmitu garumā. Latviešu vēsturiskā apziņa ir palikusi 1940. gada pirmsokupācijas vasarā, kamēr ap mums 70 gadu laikā ļoti daudz kas ir mainījies…”

Bringing up FDR in this context is such a stretch—it snaps, crackles, and pops. Apples and bathtubs, obviously, since the US was and is a vast empire with well-established democratic institutions. One can talk about packing the Supreme Court, etc., with little profit from such a comparison—but the fact is that FDR did not try to become Vadonis, did not shutter Congress, did not ban all political parties, did not appoint village elders from Washington, did not establish an anti-democratic personality cult… shall I go on? To offer a more applicable context, Juan José Linz, a leading expert on authoritarianism:

Contrary to the image of a Europe engulfed by fascism and of democracies overwhelmed by antidemocratic forces, we have to emphasize the large number of the democracies that survived (until German occupation). The list includes: the United Kingdom, France (despite serious threats), Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland (despite a dangerous crisis). A total of ten countries. The number of democracies, not just liberal constitutional states, or developing, emerging, possible, democracies, that broke down is much smaller: Italy, Germany, Austria and Spain in 1936. That is four countries. The other cases of breakdown—Russia, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Spain 1923, Portugal 1917 and 1925, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece—would perhaps be better defined as breakdowns of liberal constitutional regimes, of countries in the process of democratization, or aborted processes of consolidation of democracy, than of fully democratic regimes. Nine countries, to add to the four and the three Baltic republics, a total of sixteen. We do not count Albania, a premodern society and state in the making.  Of the states existing before World War I, nine were stable democracies in the interwar years and in six cases democratization was frustrated or democracy broke down. The successor states of Empires: Russia, Turkey, Austro-Hungary and Germany, all experienced breakdown. Eight new states were born in the aftermath of the War and only in three: Finland, Czechoslovakia (until its disintegration under German pressure) and Ireland, democracy survived while five others: Poland, Yugoslavia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia experienced authoritarian breakdowns. Established statehood and being neutral or among the victors were favorable to democracy. Besides, being constitutional monarchies seems to have favored democratic stability. The fascist movements were generally unsuccessful in destroying European democracies, but they contributed to their crises and a few gained power or a share in power. The existence of an Italian fascist regime and after 1933 the Nazi system, exercised an influence in the form authoritarian regimes took in that period, although it would be difficult to say that it was sufficient to characterize those regimes as fascist. This, however, makes it difficult to distinguish fascist, semi-fascist, and non-fascist authoritarian regimes, particularly since there is no consensus on what the Italian fascist regime actually was like. It is easier to distinguish the authoritarian regimes from Nazi totalitarianism after its full consolidation in power. The success and appeal of fascist movements influenced other anti-democratic parties and movements, making clear distinctions difficult.

The factors involved in the breakdown of democracy were complex, and the specifics varied dramatically from country to country, even between the Baltic states—as did the forms authoritarianism took. In Estonia, for instance, the Päts coup was motivated by the popularity of the ultra-nationalist Vaps. Kasekamp notes two major differences between the Estonian coup and the coup by Ulmanis that was directly inspired by it. [To be cont’d.]

[Cont’d.] Ulmanis’ coup was directed against the Socialists—in Estonia, the Socialists gave Päts their tacit support. Ulmanis did not suppress the extreme right Pērkonkrusts, as Päts suppressed Vaps, until after Celmiņš (who was offered the post of Ambassador to France, of all places) refused to cooperate. I would add that Pērkonkrusts was in no way comparable to Vaps; it was not a popular grouping. Further, in terms of form—unlike Ulmanis, Päts attempted to legitimize his rule. A new constitution was introduced, though Estonia remained authoritarian.

But let’s not pretend Ulmanis softened the Latvians for Soviet subjugation. We can’t project today’s sensibilities on another time and place. That is such an oft-heard refrain—“he was a product of his time,” etc. Sorry, but from what time and place were those who remained faithful to democratic principles, in that case? See this article on Bishop Rancāns, for instance, which also contains fascinating information on continuity and on trimda attitudes. Unlike in Estonia, there was no real threat to democracy in Latvia in 1934—other than from Ulmanis and his droogs.

As to myth and reality, see Gatis Krūmiņš‘s “Kārlis Ulmanis – mīts vai realitāte”. An extract: “Pirmkārt, jāatzīst, ka 30. gadu otrā puse tautas atmiņā objektīvi ir palikusi kā stabilitātes un labklājības laiks, jo pirms tam bija pasaules ekonomiskā krīze, bet pēc tam – padomju okupācija un staļinisms. Otrkārt, runājot un rakstot par 30. gadiem, tiek izmantota tā laika literatūra un periodiskie izdevumi, piemēram, Atpūta, aizmirstot, ka tolaik bija cenzūra. Par K. Ulmaņa politiku drīkstēja rakstīt tikai labu vai neko. Salīdzinājumam – tikpat labi varētu pētīt 1940. gada notikumus, kā avotu izmantojot Pravdu vai Cīņu.”

I do not think that pointing out that Ulmanis prepared the way for totalitarianism is pretense. This has been made rather clear in various writings for quite some time—in the trimda as well. Ezergailis on Aizsilnieks’ massive economic history, in 1969: “Šķiet, ka lielākie iebildumi no Aizsilnieka grāmatas lasītāju puses būtu autoram jādzird par viņa Ulmaņa jeb autoritārā režīma analizi. Pašreiz trimdas ulmaniešu vairogu falanga, ar ko tie iznāca emigrācijā, ir jau daudzējādi iedragāta. Līdz šim tikai viens no šiem vairogiem bija neaizkarts. Lai arī kā mēs domājām par Ulmaņa režīmu, mēs ticējām, ka Ulmanis vismaz saimnieciski licis Latvijai zaļot. Aizsilnieks ir sadrumstalojis šo vairogu. Nedomāju, ka ulmanieši nepavisam to nevarēs saķitēt, bet tas nebūs viegli un tas nekad vairs neizskatīsies tik spīdošs. [...] Diriģētās saimniecības ievešanā autors saskata daudz ironijas. Tās aizstāvji to attaisnojuši kā saimniecības ‘latviskošanu’, jo apmēram divas trešdaļas no saimniecības agrāk piederējušas nelatviešiem. Bet autors nedomā, ka šis bijis īstais veids, kā ‘latviskot’ saimniecību, jo valsts pārņēmusi arī visus latviešu uzņēmumus. Galvenais, ko šī veida saimniecība esot panākusi, bijis Latvijas sagatavošana komūnistu izdarītai nacionālizēšanai. Autora skatījumā tiem bijis maz vairs ko konfiscēt. Šīs ir uzbudinošas, bet arī svaigas domas.” (Italics mine.)

I have met many people who remember the Ulmanis regime from adulthood, too (and many more who idealize it after having spent only their youth or childhood in that period). As Ezergailis writes of Holocaust survivors’ evidence, it “has the shortcomings of eyewitness accounts in general: they are very uneven and narrow, limited to the witness’s own experience.” The same applies. What did they actually experience in the period, directly and indirectly, what was their relationship to the regime, what did they have to compare it to, what is/was their ideology, etc.

I’ve been to both Belarus and Syria, where I heard plenty of people singing the praises of their respective dictators with genuine emotion. Some were moved to tears, even. Heck, you will even find numerous people in Latvia who praise Lukashenko, whose regime is actually reminiscent of Ulmanis’. Here is some detail on censorship under Ulmanis. As to the ludicrous personality cult and the reeducation of the populace in an anti-democratic spirit—need I provide you with examples?

I’ll close with a snippet from an interview with Knuts Skujenieks: [To be cont’d.]

[Cont’d.]

Kā jūs atbildētu uz jautājumu par demokrātijas izpratni latviešos un krievos?

— Izprast viņi varbūt arī izprot, tīri vēsturiskās pieredzes dēļ, bet ne visi pieturas pie šiem demokrātijas principiem un ne vienmēr demokrātiju vērtē pietiekami pozitīvi. Latviešu priekšrocība ir tā, ka viņi varbūt labāk zina, kā dzīvot, bet tas nenozīmē, ka viņi pie šī principa vienmēr pieturas. Mums ir diezgan smaga vēsturiskā pieredze starpkaru periodā, pirmās neatkarības laikā, jo parlamentārisms nepaguva izveidoties pietiekami civilizēts, Ulmanim bija ļoti viegli izveidot valsts apvērsumu. Rezultātā vesela paaudze izauga uz absolūti antidemokrātiskiem pamatiem.

Ar ko tie atšķiras no tiem, kas izauga PSRS?

— Praktiski ne ar ko, latviešu sabiedrībai tā ir bijusi padomju laiku priekšspēle. Latvijā, kaut arī ne visai spēcīgas, tomēr ir saglabājušās pirmskara sociāldemokrātijas paliekas.

Visu gaišu,
/P

Pehteris C,
Why attack old meat when new meat is in front of your face:  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/09/gorbachev-putin-exhausted-himself-russian

Who’s your “neighbor,” Pehteris C.?  I found a new opportunity for you to carry on about a new version of “You stay in your place” plus “not a few” killing “not a few” in Syria: 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/02/09/Stay-out-of-Syria-Putin-says/UPI-88661328806514/