Ušakovs: Es provocēju latviešus - ejiet pie krieviem, sarunājiet, kā normāli dzīvot tālāk 127

Diena.lv, 2011. gada 23. novembris 09:07
“Es provocēju latviešus, bet ziniet, uz ko? Lai viņi, lai latviešu politiķi sāk runāt ar krievu cilvēkiem. Gribat, lai Lindermans būtu noteicējs tam, ko zināmā mērā tur pie sirds šeit dzīvojošie krievi? To gribat sasniegt? Tāpēc provocēju latviešus – ejiet pie krieviem, sarunājiet, kā normāli varēsim dzīvot tālāk.” / (Rīgas mērs Nils Ušakovs intervijā Latvijas Avīzei, 23.11.2011.)

in russian, right? actually, in english, because there is no
use for russian language in EvroSojuz….............

it’s a main immigrant language, grazhdanyn.

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Dialogs Are Trimdiniekiem….“Happy Thanksgiving Day Wishes For Tomorrow”

As all the diaspora Letts here in the US have known for years, T-Day is a big family celebration day with many family members travelling great distances to rebond with their families. I wish all of you who are travelling a safe journey and great food, fun, and frolic. Make some good memories. I have many memories of my parents and my friends’ parents saying to us young kids frolicking about….“runājiet Latviski !!!”

Alberts

Hi Peter B:

First of all, I apologize for side-tracking your thread with my last post. I did it in a hurry as I was hoofing it out the door and didn’t double-check what I was doing. Actually thought I was creating a new thread, hence the bold green title, etc. Obviously misfired. Sorry for that.

As to my experience with your actual present thread-topic, Peter B., in respect to speaking to Russians in Latvia when I’ve visited there, it’s historically been a mixed bag for me personally. Being conversant in only Latvian, English, and German and not Russian, the ball winds up in their court to pick a language we can connect in, if some sort of communication is needed. Some of them excercise one of the available options and others apparently might think that the monkey is on my back to learn their language if I want to be respected by them.

Likewise some repatriated Letts who speak several of the languages that I speak, they only choose to dole out respect if I and others like me were to move there like they did. Reasons for connecting and not connecting….they obviously vary. Language is just a tool for achieving a possible connection. In and of itself, the tool doesn’t achieve the connection. Real live people use the tools however suits their needs and desires.

The issues seem also to be multi-layered. I won’t paint the Russian speakers as “bad guys” and I certainly won’t label the Latvian language purists as automatic “good guys” either. You take each relationship on a case-by-case basis.

Alberts

case by case is not the point. russian doesn’t need an official status.
it is used widely in Latvia and will be for a while.
russian is a major immigrant language in UE and
language of majority of immigrants in Latvia.

How soon we forget, Petey: “no taking sides = no forum” (to use your own words)

In your most recent post reply to me you said the following:

“case by case is not the point. russian doesn’t need an official status.
it is used widely in Latvia and will be for a while.
russian is a major immigrant language in UE and
language of majority of immigrants in Latvia.”

So, where to begin?

Number 1, like many skim-the-surface thinkers you didn’t actually MAKE a point in your original post. You just threw a grenade “out there”.

Number 2, “taking sides” is by no means the only or best way to tease through the issues that create flashpoints like this one. Those threatened by discussion of ideas prefer a scoresheet that designates “who’s side are you on?” It keeps things simple for those thwarted by complexity.

Number 3, for the record, I see no sweeping need to declare Russian as a second official language in Latvia, either….but then again, there are MY points and then there are YOUR points. It’s not just THE one and only point, except for a select few “dittoheads” who like that kind of digital categoriztion of polarizable positions and I really hate using that term because I loathe Rush Limbaugh’s Radio Talk Show and the Fox News “pinheads” supporters, where that terminology has become iconic.

Happy Thanksgiving,

Alberts

Happy Thanksgiving, Albert and Lolers far and wide!

I’ve been enjoying reading all the posts here—am glad to see Peter C back again;myself, I just don’t have the energy right now to say much more.

Enjoy the weekend, brivdienas!

Irena

Likewise, Happy Thanksgiving!

peter B - 23 November 2011 05:25 AM

Ušakovs: Es provocēju latviešus - ejiet pie krieviem, sarunājiet, kā normāli dzīvot tālāk

Diena.lv, 2011. gada 23. novembris 09:07
“Es provocēju latviešus, bet ziniet, uz ko? Lai viņi, lai latviešu politiķi sāk runāt ar krievu cilvēkiem. Gribat, lai Lindermans būtu noteicējs tam, ko zināmā mērā tur pie sirds šeit dzīvojošie krievi? To gribat sasniegt? Tāpēc provocēju latviešus – ejiet pie krieviem, sarunājiet, kā normāli varēsim dzīvot tālāk.” / (Rīgas mērs Nils Ušakovs intervijā Latvijas Avīzei, 23.11.2011.)

Well. really, why do the Latvians need to reach out to anyone? It’s been quite clear to me that, since the beginning right after regaining independence, there are those who:

(a) look upon Latvia as their homeland and see it as part of their commitment to their homeland to integrate and to work for its betterment versus
(b) look upon Latvia and its inhabitants as their chattel to be exploited and bled dry for their own personal gain.

My overwhelming experience has been that “Latvian” or “Russian” is completely unrelated to the above, so Ušakovs’ suggesting the Latvians reach out for dialog with Russians is ultimately

(a) meaningless and
(b) polarizing in its very suggestion.

The dialog needed is about building a better Latvia. I recently heard Ušakovs in an interview on (state-owned and state-controlled) Russia Today cable TV. Complaining in Russian about the historical politics of citizens versus non-citizens instead of focusing on economic issues. (Am I wrong to think that, if not at the time, certainly 20 years after independence it is a choice to be a nepilsons?)

I should add that Ušakovs’ interview was pasted into a half hour anti-Latvian diatribe (oops, “documentary”) rehashing all the usual Kremlin crap including the obligatory homage to Kononov, complete with an interview where Kononov complains about Latvian fascists, segue to Aivars Garda being represented as a mainstream Latvian politician. (And, of course, no mention that Kononov is (a) dead and (b) that his conviction was ultimately upheld; or (c) that Garda and his “DDD” newspaper is as “mainstream” in Latvia as Johan Bäckman is in Finland.)

20 Post-Soviet years: Latvia

Another blend of truths, half-truths, and lies from the Kremlin in its never-ending assault on Latvia.  After more than two decades of independence restored, I am tired of Russia pummeling Latvia on the world stage and Russia’s thuggery being met with… wait… I hear it… false alarm, just crickets.

P.S. Apologies that I’m not feeling particularly contemplative or introspective today…

From Edward Lucas on twitter:
“Outrageoes new Russian MFA statement justifies, Stalin-style, seizure of Baltic states, Hitler-Stalin pact bit.ly/sIv7qg (in Russian)”

Current Russian view (google translate version from Edward Lucas twitter)
The foreign political activity of the USSR
ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II

After the occupation by German troops in France in June 1940, the international situation deteriorated significantly, increased the threat of Hitler’s attack on others. The Soviet-German relations became noticeably increase the tension. In August 1940, at the seventh session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the report on the foreign policy of the Soviet government stated that the world was on the eve of a “new phase of amplification of the war.”

Along with strengthening industrial and economic base of the Soviet Union, the preparation of the country’s defense, it was necessary to establish as far as possible, the most favorable position in the international arena.

Of particular importance the Soviet leadership gave the building the north-western borders. It was important to avoid turning the Baltic into a base for aggression against the USSR. Despite the conclusion of the fall of 1939 mutual aid agreements with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the governments of these countries have continued to carry out anti-Soviet policy. They created problems primarily at addressing specific issues related to the placement of Soviet garrisons in these countries and also to enhance cooperation with Nazi Germany. Governments of the Baltic countries have repeatedly stated that such actions violate their obligations under bilateral treaties.

However, the policy of the ruling circles of the Baltic States did not support the majority of the population, and then held in July 1940 elections to the People’s Saeima of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to the State Duma of power in these states came loyal to the Soviet Union forces. All of the above legislative appealed to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to take their country into the Soviet state, and in early August 1940, this request was granted. The result - the safety of the north-western borders of the Soviet Union was consolidated, which has seriously improved the resistance to German aggression in this direction [my bold.]

At the end of June 1940 the Soviet government had made the peaceful resolution of the return of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. Soviet - Romanian conflict over this issue arose in 1918, when Bessarabian lands were seized by the Romanians. The Soviet Union never put up with violent rejection of the region, as he repeatedly said to the world. June 26, 1940 the Romanian ambassador in Moscow was handed a statement of the Soviet government, in which Romania offered to return the original Russian land - Bessarabia and Bukovina, and northern part of - the Soviet Union.

The Romanian government turned to Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey with the request, how they regard the Soviet proposals. Government of these countries have advised Bucharest to resolve the conflict with the Soviet Union peacefully, making it clear to the Romanian king that “assignment” will be temporary. As a result, the Romanians are in full agreement with the proposals of the Soviet side. June 28, 1940 the Red Army entered Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Bessarabia was reunited with the Soviet Moldova and Northern Bukovina - the Ukrainian SSR.

The return of ancient lands of the Soviet Union and was an important military-strategic importance: were thwarted Romanian leadership and their supporters to turn this region into a base for the upcoming war against the Soviet Union.

Thus, the Soviet government has been able to complete the political education against the advancing German aggression throughout the western borders of the USSR.

Through the prism of strengthening the security of the Soviet Union and deter aggressive ambitions of Nazi German leaders, the Soviet Government considered and relations with Berlin.

It was important to prevent the involvement of the Soviet Union into the war with Germany prematurely, before the state prepare to repulse military aggression, which is inevitable, no one had any doubts. These goals were subordinated to the Soviet-German relations in the political and economic fields.

One of the steps aimed at postponing the start of the war with Germany was the Soviet-German nonaggression pact is more known as a “Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact.” This document and the attached secret additional protocol on the delimitation of spheres of interest was signed on August 23, 1939

Moral and political damage to the Soviet Union, signed the contract with the Nazi regime, it seems obvious. However, the fact remains that the contract allowed the USSR to win about two years to strengthen the defense and prepare for the inevitable armed clash with Germany (another matter of debate - how effective this time was used), the western border of the Soviet Union was pushed by an average of 300 km., western regions of Ukraine and Belarus have been merged with the rest of these republics.

In addition, the agreement has caused some friction between Germany and Japan at the very time when the Soviet troops fought against the Japanese on the Khalkhin Gol. All of this is during World War II contributed to the Soviet Union avoided the disastrous war on two fronts. Pragmatism in this case, he defeated the vibrations of the ideological and moral-political nature. In addition, a similar kind of pacts with Germany were already in the UK and France. [cont’d]

The Soviet leadership sought to eliminate the friction that arose in the relations with Germany. June 10, 1940 Convention was concluded on the procedure of settling border disputes and incidents, and August 31, 1940 - an agreement on border legal relations. January 10, 1941 between the two countries signed agreements on the settlement of reciprocal property claims relating to the reunification of the Baltic States and the USSR.

    During the visit, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars Molotov in Berlin in November 1940, held at the invitation of the German side, the Germans justified their aggressive policy, in particular in the Balkans, the need to wage war against England. During the talks in Berlin would like to reach an agreement with the Soviet government’s plans for dividing the world into spheres of influence, which was strongly rejected by the Soviet delegation. It demanded the withdrawal of German troops from Finland, stop German expansion in areas that directly affect the security of the USSR, primarily in the Balkans and the Middle East.

    The Berlin talks gave the Soviet government to probe the intentions of Hitler, and in this sense have brought some benefits. First of all, it became clear that Germany was not associated with England. This circumstance made it possible to rely on London as a potential ally in the fight against Nazi Germany. It also became clear that Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria were actually Nazi satellites, Greece was close to it, and that Turkey has ever been linked by close ties with Germany, or was on its way to this. In the Balkans, the only country which, to some extent could be counted as a possible future ally of the anti-Hitler camp, only remained of Yugoslavia.

    The policy towards the Balkan countries in the Soviet Union pursued the overall objective - to prevent the spread of war in the South-Eastern Europe. Since the Soviet government twice - in 1939 and 1940 made an attempt to conclude a pact with Bulgaria on mutual assistance. The Bulgarians have rejected these proposals, and in mid-November 1940 the Bulgarian king Boris III at a meeting with Hitler secretly agreed to join the Tripartite Pact.

    The Soviet government has also taken certain diplomatic steps to improve relations with Horthy’s Hungary. In September 1940, were signed by the Soviet-Hungarian agreement on navigation and trade and payments agreement aimed at promoting trade relations between the two countries. However, the Soviet Union did not ignore the aggressive acts of the fascist regime in Hungary. Thus, the Soviet government strongly condemns the participation of Hungary in the attack on Yugoslavia, the Nazis.

    Soviet Union has done much to prevent the spread of hostilities to the territory of Yugoslavia. After what happened there in March 1941. anti-German coup in connection with this threat of aggression against the country of Germany, Soviet diplomacy has taken an important step to prevent this threat - in April 1941 in Moscow between the USSR and Yugoslavia signed an agreement on friendship and nonaggression. It contains five articles. Article 1 provides for the mutual obligation of non-aggression and respect for the independence and territorial integrity. Article 2 states that if the contracting party is attacked by a third State, the other contracting party “undertakes to comply with a policy of friendly relations with her.” This wording is fundamentally different from the obligations contained in the usual non-aggression treaty. On the day of the invasion of fascist forces in Yugoslavia, April 6, 1941, the Soviet government after the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs made a new warning Germany.

    The occupation of the Balkans, the Germans created a security threat not only to the Soviet Union, and Turkey. This threat is particularly intensified after the Wehrmacht into Bulgaria. In March 1941, the Turkish ambassador in Moscow was told that if his government is really under attack, it can count on understanding and neutrality of the Soviet Union. However, Ankara has taken a different path - June 18, 1941 it entered into a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with Germany.

    An important link in the international relations of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War was Iran. Among the factors determining the attitude of the Soviet Union and Iran in the last third of the 30s was the expansion of comprehensive ties with Tehran, Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, which the Iranians regarded as a “third force”, as opposed to the traditional influence of Great Britain and Russia. This policy of the Iranian leadership be affected by the Soviet-Iranian relations and the USSR did for the Iranian direction very vulnerable, which made its southern borders rather tense situation.

    After the Second World War, the Iranian government announced September 4, 1939 on its neutrality, but the signing in Moscow on September 28, 1939 Soviet-German treaty of friendship and the border has caused great concern in Iran. The head of Iran’s Reza Shah was afraid to openly support either side, so as I thought possible invasion of Iran in England, in the event of its accession to the powers of the “axis”, or the Soviet Union with the support of Germany, if Iran will side with the English.

    The Soviet Union has made a serious diplomatic steps to prevent the attack of Germany after its capture of Denmark and Norway to Sweden. April 13, 1940 the German ambassador to Moscow, von der Schulenburg, it was stated: “The Soviet government was very interested in the fact that Sweden’s neutrality was preserved, that a breach of it would be undesirable for the Soviet Government and that the latter is hoped that the inclusion of Sweden the German share will not take place. ”

Such a strong position in Berlin had an impact. April 16, Schulenburg made a statement about the attitude of Germany to the neutrality of Sweden. It said that Germany “has no intention to extend its military operation in the northern Swedish territory” and “definitely decided to respect the neutrality of Sweden, while Sweden, for its part, will maintain complete neutrality and not to provide assistance to the Western powers.” Active assistance of Sweden to maintain its neutrality, the Soviet Union provided later.

    Relations with Great Britain on the eve of World War II were not easy, mainly because of the traditional anti-Soviet policy in London. The British government tried not only to improve bilateral relations with the Soviet Union as to aggravate relations between Moscow and Berlin, and, on occasion, and to provoke a conflict between them. To this end it has taken in the prewar years, a series of diplomatic maneuvers that have been successfully “repulsed” by the Soviet side.

    British government was not very easy to come to the conclusion that if Germany attacked the USSR in London should be on his side, so as to help the Soviet Union, Great Britain saves himself.

    U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union also was not wearing a friendly nature, which was particularly noticeable during the Soviet-Finnish conflict (30.11.1939 - 12. 03.1940). In December 1939 the U.S. imposed a “moral embargo” on trade with the USSR. This had a negative impact primarily on bilateral trade and economic relations, led to a review of the Soviet Union, the American experts, the ban Soviet engineers visit companies in the U.S., etc. “The moral embargo” was lifted only in January 1941, when after the defeat of France was a significant increase in powers of the “axis” and the Americans seriously concerned about Hitler’s expansionist plans in South America and the United States.

    However, a number of fundamental issues of political relations between Moscow and Washington, the U.S. government still did not show willingness to reach a proper understanding with the USSR. The United States continued to occupy the anti-Soviet stance, when it comes to recognizing the western border of the USSR, as well as persisting in the U.S. Baltic missions of non-existent States, the held by the Americans confiscated gold belonging to the State Bank of the USSR and certain other matters.

    And while in the second half of 1940 - early 1941 Soviet-American relations have been some development, anti-Soviet tendencies in U.S. policy continued to prevail. The tension in bilateral relations continued until the outbreak of World War II.

    An important place in the foreign policy of the USSR is engaged in providing security in the Far East. Relations with Japan have developed is not easy, given the anti-Soviet policy of the Japanese Government and a number of controversial economic issues. After lengthy negotiations, April 13, 1941 signed a neutrality pact.

    In accordance with this document, the parties pledged to “maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability” of the other contracting party. In the case of “if one of the Contracting Parties become the object of military action by one or several third powers, the other Contracting Party will observe neutrality in the continuation of the conflict.” Victory at Khalkhin-, this pact (and later - the USSR’s military successes on the Western Front) was in fact secured the postponement of first, and then did the Japanese rejection of the attack on the Soviet state.

    In the last pre-war days of the Soviet Union tried to obstruct diplomatic means and aggression by Nazi Germany. So, June 13, 1941, Molotov handed Schulenburg TASS message intended for publication in the Soviet press and radio. It said that Moscow and Berlin has steadily observe and comply with the terms of the Soviet-German treaty in 1939 and that the rumors that the Soviet Union was preparing for war with Germany, are false and provocative. This post has been published in Soviet newspapers, June 14, 1941 Public response to it by the German government has not followed. In order to strike up negotiations with the leadership of Germany on June 20 in the German Foreign Ministry was handed over to the text of the notes violated the Soviet border on German aircraft. Yet they strongly deviated from discussing the issues raised.

    The evening of 21 June there was another attempt to start negotiations with the German government. To this end, Molotov summoned to Schulenburg and familiarized him with the contents transmitted on the eve of the German Foreign Office notes. Furthermore Soviet People’s Commissar asked the German ambassador: what is the discontent of Germany to the Soviet Union, if any? What explains the increased spread of rumors of the imminent war between Germany and the Soviet Union? It was also asked about the reasons for the exodus from Moscow in the last days of the German Embassy staff and their wives. In conclusion, Schulenburg was asked - if the lack of any response to the German government for soothing and peaceful TASS on 14 June? Efforts to call people’s commissar of German Ambassador to the discussion of these issues have been unsuccessful.

    After this meeting, the Soviet ambassador in Berlin on the phone was handed a coded telegram, which reported the contents of the conversation which took place June 21 Molotov Schulenburg.

Does anyone really believe the russky tripe anymore? With putin looking forward to the “Return of the Empire” , the fallacy of the downtrodden locals and their “language rights” is mere propaganda tool reminiscent of WWII. The Kremlin apologists never left,they merely changed their message to conform to the naive expectations of the “good will” crowd. When putin comes knocking on the door , they will be overjoyed to welcome their “savior”. With EU on the financial ropes , the natives will concede without a whimper. Maybe the Latvians are incapable of self governance as the last elections appear to indicate .

...reminiscent of WWII…

«Vēsturisko paralēļu vilkšana ir interesanta nodarbe, piedevām ar milzīgu manipulācijas devu.»—Kaspars Zellis, «Volksrussen»

Visu gaišu,
/P

Zellis’ article confuses me. On one hand, he says the comparison of Sudetenland and Danzig-Corridor Germans with post-Soviet Russians is inaccurate; but then all the details he gives, including the coordination of Reichsdeutsch propaganda with local Volksdeutsch activism, look very much like what we see today.  In fact, didn’t Luzhkov state, a few months before the snap elections, that he expected Latvia to make Russian the second state language soon?

Once again it’s hard to to judge what’s going on.  Will there be provocations leading up to the referendum for Moscow to use as a pretext to “protect” its nationals by force? That makes the Dzimtā valoda business look like a well-thought-out advance step in the process.  On the other hand, figures like Dolgopolovs and Ušakovs seem to be tripping over their own feet as they back-pedal from their support for the petition: http://www.ir.lv/2011/12/2/dolgopolovs-parakstu-vaksana-neveicina-iedzivotaju-saliedetibu. That supports Aivars Ozoliņš’ argument, in the same edition, to the effect that what worked for Kremlin interests in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (and in process in Ukraine) is in Latvia, if not a mistake, at least a sign that SC is a ‘bankrotējis projekts’:  http://www.ir.lv/2011/12/3/referendums-nesaskanai. If that’s the case, it leaves previously conciliatory SC’ers branded as disloyal, and the Latvians more united than usual—not what the referendum’s proponents were looking for.

It promises to be an interesting winter.

Labvakar!

The distinctions between Estonia and Latvia are actually pretty profound—or, are they?

In Estonia, about a third of Russians have taken Russian citizenship. Estonia is also far more liberal in policy, though—non-citizens can vote at a local level. The history and current reality are also quite different—geographically concentrated and mostly recent, and of a different socio-economic stripe, Estonia’s Russians haven’t nearly the cachet they’ve had in Latvia, and Latvians… well…

I don’t really disagree with what our name-brother Vecrumba wrote. But—the reality I have sniffed, on the ground (and one could even use one’s nose here in this lovely forum) is that it wouldn’t especially matter how or if anybody integrated. And that is where Latvia runs into deep trouble. A Russkie is a Russkie is a Russkie—what space has she, or he?

Most people I talked to re SC being in govt. were woefully disinformed and pretty darn ignorant—the main point was never to let Russians into leadership roles again. And for the next few months this will get really sharp, won’t it—they be trying to force Russian down our throats!

And Russia being Russia—what a fun election—quo vadis?

And is it not funny to see long-lost former trimdinieki gurgling about Latvians not being ready for self-govt.?

/P